چکیده:
یدور هذا البحث حول موضوع طبیعة المعرفة البشریة، وحدودها
المعرفیة، من حیث کونها مطلقة أو نسبیة، ومدی تأثیرها علی العقیدة
الدینیة، ورؤیة الإنسان عن الحیاة.
وتتناول هٰذه الدراسة مسألةً أساسیّةً وخطیرةً، لها أکبر الأثر علی الرؤیة
العَقَدیّة عند أیّ إنسانٍ، وهی کون المعرفة الإنسانیّة مطلقةً أو نسبیّةً، أی
هل یمکننا أن نتعرّف علی الأشیاء کما هی علیه فی الواقع ونفس الأمر، أو
أنّنا لا ندرک إلّ الأشیاء من حیث هی ظاهرةٌ لنا، دون الواقع.
وقد اعتمدنا فی تحقیق مسائل هٰذا البحث علی المنهج العقلیّ البرهانیّ؛
دراساتٌ لأنّه المنهج المعرفی الوحید - کما ثبت فی علم المنطق، وصناعة البرهان -
الّی یمکن أن یضمن لنا الیقین الموضوعیّ الصادق الثابت فی مثل هٰذه
المسائل الأصولیّة، والمصیریة؛ إذ لا یحتمل مثل هٰذا البحث الاعتماد علی
المناهج الظنّیّة الأخری.
وقد قمنا بتلخیص النتائج الکلّیّة الّتی توصّلنا لها من خلال البحث، من
تأصیل قواعد البحث المعرفیّ، وبیان حجّیّة الأدوات المعرفیّة، وحدودها
المعرفیّة، ومن بیان أنّ الدافع للقول بالنسبیّة المعرفیّة هو الجهل أو تجاهل
المبادئ العقلیّة الأوّلیّة، والخلط بین المعرفة الاعتباریّة والظنّیّة والإضافیّة
من جهةٍ وبین مطلق المعرفة، وأنّ الدافع للقول بالنسبیّة الدلالیّة، هو تأثّر
المفرّ دائمًا بثقافته الخاصّة فی فهم النصوص، هٰذا بالإضافة إلی بیان مبانی
القائلین بالمعرفة المطلقة القائمة علی البرهان العقلیّ، والتمییز بین الطرق
العلمیّة وغیر العلمیّة فی التعرّف علی الواقع فی نفسه. وقمنا أیضًا بدفع
شبهات النسبیّة المعرفیّة والدلالیّة، لتستقرّ بعدها موازین علمیّةٌ موضوعیّةٌ
مطلقةٌ للمعرفة البشریّة.
هٰذا بالإضافة إلی بیان الآثار العقدیّة الإیجابیّة للمعرفة المطلقة، الناشئة
من وجود مزانٍ علمیٍّ موضوعیٍّ مطلقٍ فی مجال معرفة العقائد الواقعیّة،
وبیان الآثار العقدیّة السلبیّة للمعرفة النسبیّة، من تضییع العقائد والقیم
الأخلاقیّة، وتشتّت الآراء العقدیّة؛ ممّا یمهّد الأرضیّة للصراع الفکریّ
والمذهبیّ الرافض لهٰذه النسبیّة.
وفی نهایة البحث قدّمنا بعض التوصیات العلمیّة والثقافیّة، کضرورة
إحیاء العلوم العقلیّة، والاهتمام بتدریسها، وبناء الکوادر العلمیّة
المتخصّصة، والکوادر المثقّفة بالثقافة العقلیّة الأصیلة؛ من أجل الوقایة
والعلاج للمشاکل الّی أوجدتها المعرفة النسبیّة، لا سیّما فی المراکز
الأکادیمیّة، وذٰلک عن طریق إصلاح النظامین التعلیمیّ والثقافیّ فی شیّ
المراکز التعلیمیّة الدینیّة والأکادیمیّة؛ من أجل النهوض بالمجتمعات البشریّة.
The essay touches on an elementary and serious issue that has
its great impact on every man’s view of the creed. This
issue namely is the determination whether human knowledge is absolute
or relative. In other words, it discusses the question whether we, human
beings, are able to find out things as they actually are in reality or we cannot
realize the total features of a thing; rather, we are only able to realize the
apparent features the we can see but not as they really are.
In investigating the issues related to this thesis, the writer employs the
demonstrative intellect approach; he thus first establishes the substantial
principles on which he would rest in the judgment between the two opposite
trends and then starts with exhibiting the various divisions of human
knowledge in terms of their epistemological tools and their innately natural
features in order, in a coming stage, to prove the various epistemological
tools as serving as valid arguments and to point to the frame within which
these tools act as valid arguments in the issue of revealing the reality of
things.
The writer then classifies the relative knowledge into two classes; the
while the process of believing is founded on believing that our knowledge is
accurate, it is both natural and necessary that the attitude of the demonstrative
intellect to all creeds is the necessity of these creeds, in their origination and
in the nature of their contents, being based on the criteria of the demonstrative
rational practice.
In order to shed more light on this specific issue as swiftly as possible,
the writer of the current study explained briefly what is meant by the
theoretical creeds following in action the rational primaries in the criteria
of their coming into being and in the nature of their contents. Naturally, this
necessitates presenting a set of principles related to the rational primaries,
the creeds and the theoretical construction. Hence, when principles are set,
it becomes easy to understand the ideas as clearly as they are and it becomes
accessible to see how the parts of objections are detached from one another
after they have been arisen from either a shortcoming in the image formed
about them or a flaw in the spontaneous principle of both their applicable
examples and judgments.
reason in issues related to God have based their opposition on their denial of
the idea that reason is capable of issuing true judgments absolutely. They
thus claim that even the so-called rational primaries are not provably true
except in the frame of the tangible things, while it is not known for sure, they
believe, whether these primaries are applicable to such topics like God and
His creational and administrative acts.
Conversely, those who accepted the primaries of the intellect as true rejected
its judgments about further topics than these primaries; and this rejection is
based either on their denial of the intellect being capable enough to trace
back the hypothetical rational knowledge to the primary knowledge and
their distrusting the attempts of others who tried to do so-as is shown in the
words of some of them-or on the denial of the applicability of the rational
primaries to all topics and existing things, as is shown in the words of others.
Throughout centuries, the founders of the Demonstrative Intellect approach
who presented it in its educational form have frequently pointed to this
issue, but full acquaintance with the Demonstrative Intellect approach alone
can solve all these disputes. Hence, not all rational practices can assure the
accuracy of its results; rather, there are five types of rational practices, each
of which has its own particular purpose. Amongst these five types, only the
demonstrative practice is able to explain the regulations of the act of the
intellect in a way that ensures the attainment of accurate knowledge when
certain principles are present, or stresses on evasion of issuing any judgment
when such principles are absent.
As a conclusion, it must be noted that inasmuch as the intellect, when
practicing its demonstrative effort, aims at attaining accurate knowledge